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Ethics, Professionalism and the Practice of Law
Frederick A. Elliston *
I. INTRODUCTION
Does professional lawyering demand that a lawyer act ethically?
The legal profession's answer to this question remains ambivalent.
Some lawyers treat ethics as a necessary evil, endured as a course
in law school but quickly put aside in the daily practice of law.
Other lawyers conveniently invoke ethics to buttress their image
and prove that lawyers are more than "hired guns."
Ethics should neither exist as an incidental adjunct to the curric-
ulum nor as mere rhetoric used to improve a lawyer's image.
Rather, ethics should function as the core of a lawyer's practice.
Without ethics, true professionalism and good lawyering escape us.
This article will sketch the recent growth of the field of profes-
sional ethics and describe the general role of ethics in professional
life. Then it will identify four essential contributions ethics makes
to lawyering.
The common view that a good lawyer must first be a good per-
son oversimplifies the issue. This article will examine various hy-
pothetical situations which show that professionals need to be
more than technicians. This article will contend that lawyers are
frequently pressured to act amorally if not immorally. To combat
these pressures and become more than hired guns, lawyers must
integrate ethics into their practice and thereby become profession-
als in the true sense. They must exercise their moral conscience as
well as their technical skills. This integration and exercise de-
mands knowledge gained through a continued study of profes-
sional ethics.
II. THE GROWTH AND NATURE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Over the past two decades, the interest in professional ethics has
grown dramatically. This growth emerges at several levels - new
courses, new texts, new professional societies, new research
projects and new journals. Philosophy departments now offer
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courses that were unthinkable fifty years ago.I Specialized courses
in ethics are offered by many law, medicine, business, and engi-
neering schools.2 Over a dozen universities have created centers
and institutes to integrate these curricular offerings, to provide stu-
dent internships and interdisciplinary degrees, and to conduct ma-
jor research projects.3
1. Topics like civil disobedience, ecology, sport, death, drug use, victimless crimes,
and human sexuality are regularly covered.
2. Books have been published on social and political issues such as feminism, eutha-
nasia, homicide, animal rights, energy, immigration policy, parenting, the population ex-
plosion, affirmative action, criminal justice administration, and war. See FEMINISM AND
PHILOSOPHY (J. English, F. Elliston & M. Braggin eds. 1977); THE DILEMMAS OF Eu-
THANASIA (J. Behnke & S. Bok eds. 1975) (an early but still useful collection); P. DE-
VINE, THE ETHICS OF HOMOCIDE (1978) (an effort to examine the general practice of
killing); ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS (P. Singer & T. Regan eds. 1976);
ENERGY AND THE FUTURE (G. MacLean & P. Brown eds. 1983); THE BORDER THAT
JOINS: MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS AND U.S. RESPONSIBILITY (P. Brown & H. Shue eds.
1983); J. BLUSTEIN, PARENTS AND CHILDREN: THE ETHICS OF THE FAMILY (1983);
ETHICS AND POPULATION (M. Bayles ed. 1976); R. FULLINWIDER, THE REVERSE DIS-
CRIMINATION CONTROVERSY (1980); ETHICS, PUBLIC POLICY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(F. Elliston & N. Bowie eds. 1982); M. WALTZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS (1977).
New societies have been formed in the past two decades on law, ethics, social philoso-
phy, sport, professional ethics, sex, and business. More specifically, these include the
American Section of the International Association for the Philosophy of Law and Social
Philosophy (AMINTAPHIL), the American Society for Value Inquiry (1970), the Asso-
ciation for the Philosophy of the Unconscious (1971), Colloquium for Social Philosophy
(1972), and the Philosophical Society for the Study of Sport (1972). One can also list the
Society for Women in Philosophy (1971), the Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love
(1977), the Society for the Study of Professional Ethics (1978), and the Society for Busi-
ness Ethics (1980). Several journals have appeared to promote this work during the past
few years. These include the following: BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, THE
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICS, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS,
THE WESTMINSTER REVIEW, two journals called APPLIED PHILOSOPHY (one published
in England), and most recently AGRICULTURE ETHICS. These are in addition to the
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT on bio-ethics, PHILQSOPHY AND MEDICINE, various news-
letters on the philosophy of law, philosophy of medicine, and IIT's PERSPECTIVES ON
THE PROFESSIONS.
3. These projects have been funded by government agencies such as the National
Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), joint programs such as Ethical Values in Science
and Technology (EVIST), and private foundations such as Ford, Rockefeller, Carnegie
and Exxon.
For example, Dr. Albert Flores directed an EVIST project on safety that examined the
technical, social and moral problems in setting safety standards in both the private sector
at companies like Monsanto, and in the public sector at the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA). His project addressed both substantative questions about
the factors that should be used to determine acceptable levels of risk (such as the
probability and amount of harm and the cost and effectiveness of alternative measures to
reduce it) and procedural questions of who should decide (the engineering profession, a
government regulatory agency or representatives of the public). See DESIGNING FOR
SAFETY (A. Flores ed. 1982). For another example of a project in engineering, see BE-
YOND WHISTLEBLOWING (V. Weil ed. 1983).
Dr. David Luban organized a series of papers on legal ethics with philosophers and
Ethics and Professionalism
A brief exploration into professional ethics sets the scene for de-
fining the cause of this growth and the importance of ethics in the
practice of law. In simple terms, professional ethics explores the
philosophical study of the moral problems that arise within a pro-
fession. In more theoretical terms, professional ethics articulates a
set of ethical principles that systematically resolves the moral
problems professionals face. Just as philosophical inquiry might
analyze a narrow topic like abortion and examine the moral rights
and duties of the mother, father, doctors, nurses, fetus, and other
affected parties, a philosphical inquiry can also critique an entire
profession, such as law.
Generally speaking, four traits characterize a profession:4 a spe-
cialized body of knowledge; a commitment to the social good; an
ability to regulate itself; and high social status. Consider three pro-
fessions as illustrations.
The lawyer, engineer, and doctor all have special skills that the
general public lacks. The lawyer arranges our legal affairs, helps
us exercise and protect our rights, and defends those rights against
violation. The engineer builds safe bridges, durable houses and ec-
onomical buildings. The doctor cures us when we become sick and
helps us avoid illness when we are well. The unique ability to ac-
complish these objectives distinguishes these three groups as
professionals.
With the professional's specialized knowledge comes power.
The public requires that the power be used for the social good. All
professionals act according to a code of conduct under which they
promise to use their special skills for the welfare of others. Busi-
ness people, for example, have no such code of conduct and hence
are often excluded from the ranks of professionals per se. But
lawyers. The series of papers commissioned in this project were published as THE GOOD
LAWYER (D. Luban ed. 1984). For a different selection, see ETHICS AND THE PRACTICE
OF LAW (F. Elliston & M. Davis eds., to be published 1986). Dr. Kenneth Kipnis devel-
ops the first comprehensive theory of professional ethics for the legal profession in his
forthcoming LEGAL ETHICS (1985). For a comprehensive listing of materials on moral
issues in the practice of law by philosophers, lawyers, and legal scholars, see F. ELLISTON
& J. VAN SCHAICK, LEGAL ETHICS: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND RESOURCE
GUIDE (1984).
This author directed a project with criminologists and sociologists on mechanisms for
dealing with professional dissent or whistleblowing. The project produced a series of
books: an annotated bibliography PROFESSIONAL DISSENT (1983); a casebook
WHISTLEBLOWING (1985) and a research volume WHISTLEBLOWING RESEARCH (1985).
4. A substantial period of formal education, and an interpersonal relationship be-
tween the professional and the individual seeking the professional's services have been
described as additional traits of the professional. See Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Profes-
sionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RTS. 1, 1-2 n. 1 (1975).
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judges, by contrast, are almost automatically included as profes-
sionals, partly because of their avowed commitment to use their
special skills for the social good.
Most professions enjoy a significant measure of autonomy, pro-
tected through a mechanism for self-regulation. Lawyers, for ex-
ample, have an ethical standard, the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility 5 ("Model Code"), whereby the profession itself may
discipline its members. Because of professionals' expertise, the av-
erage person hesitates to pass judgment on their conduct and relies
instead on the professionals' peers to define the proper standards
and qualifications for membership, discipline and expulsion.
Because of the knowledge, power, social commitment, and au-
tonomy that professionals have, the public typically holds profes-
sionals in high regard. The elite group's members are esteemed
and respected by others in the community.
Given these four characteristics of a profession, we can under-
stand why, for example, the practice of law is a profession while
plumbing is not. Plumbers, like lawyers, possess a certain measure
of specialized skills. Plumbers, however, are not held in as much
esteem because they do not possess the same degree of social com-
mitment, and they lack the autonomy that lawyers have in licens-
ing and disciplining their members.
III. ETHICS AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF PROFESSIONALISM
What is the relationship between ethics and professionalism?
This article claims that to be a professional requires professional
ethics and a failure to master the skills of professional ethics signals
a failure to be a professional. This claim will be defended by show-
ing that what professional ethics achieves is essential to the con-
duct of professionals.
Professionals often face harried, pressure-filled days. Why at-
tempt to squeeze ethics into their long list of daily considerations?
5. The American Bar Association House of Delegates adopted a "Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility" in 1969, now officially entitled the MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1983) ("MODEL CODE"). The Model Code has been adopted
in some form in all of the states. Most federal courts treat the Model Code as at least
persuasive authority. For an evolutionary perspective of the Model Code, see generally
Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702
(1977); Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its History and Objectives, 24
ARK. L. REV. 10 (1970).
The MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) ("MODEL RULES") are the
most recent rules that define improper conduct for disciplinary proceedings and enhance
the lawyer's professional responsibilities to others. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT SCOPE (1983).
[Vol. 16
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A series by the Hastings Center on the Teaching of Ethics in
Higher Education serves as a useful point of departure for answer-
ing this question.6 According to its authors, the teaching of ethics
can serve several different goals. At the most modest level, teach-
ing ethics can raise one's moral consciousness. Sensitizing people
to the language of morals makes them aware of a moral point of
view different from a prudential, aesthetic, epistemological or polit-
ical view. To ask what is morally right or wrong extends the focus
beyond an individual client's interests. Teaching ethics makes peo-
ple aware that they make moral decisions for which they are ac-
countable. Such moral self-consciousness is the first step to self-
knowledge and a necessary condition for the responsible behavior
we demand of all professionals.
Closely related to this first objective is a second: values clarifica-
tion. Defining good-bad or right-wrong also clarifies what it
means, in practical terms, to be a good doctor or good lawyer.
A third task in teaching ethics is the analysis of moral argu-
ments. Doctors must understand health, engineers must under-
stand safety, and lawyers must understand justice, if each of these
professions is to fulfill its social role. A full defense of an individ-
ual's particular moral values and ethical principles demands the
integration of the values in a coherent and consistent fashion. The
theory underlying the values must clearly distinguish ethical and
non-ethical disputes, define the meaning of the moral terms in-
volved, and annunciate the strength of the arguments offered.
As a fourth and final goal, teaching ethics may serve to provide
solutions to moral problems and teach these solutions as moral les-
sons. A doctor cannot forego any moral decisions involved in
whether or not to operate on a patient. A lawyer cannot avoid a
decision whether or not to accept a client. Moral questions are
inevitable and moral solutions must be based on clearly stated prin-
ciples, cogent arguments and well-articulated values.
These are the four purposes of teaching ethics. How do they
relate to professional life?
A. Moral Consciousness Raising and Professionalism
In the exercise of one's professional expertise, factual judgments
and value judgments are inextricably bound together. Profession-
6. See THE TEACHING OF ETHICS IN HIGHER EDUCATION: A REPORT By THE
HASTINGS CENTER (1980).
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als are called upon to make difficult judgments in which technical
competence and moral values are interwoven.
For example, heart transplants are modem miracles in medical
technology. What the appropriate procedures and techniques are
for performing such operations can best be answered by surgeons,
not sages. Yet whether to perform the transplant is not just a medi-
cal question, but a moral question about the rights of patients, the
importance of personal autonomy and the conflicting rights of
others competing for scarce health-care dollars. Questions about
the appropriate distribution of limited medical resources go beyond
the technical expertise of doctors and health care practitioners and
require balancing competing moral rights according to clearly ar-
ticulated principles of distributive justice.
Similarly, philosophical concepts and principles underlie the en-
tire field of criminal justice. Just as medicine requires a careful
understanding of the nature of health, law requires a careful under-
standing of the nature of justice. One cannot act justly, except in-
advertently and sporadically, unless one understands the nature of
justice. Just as the doctor has techniques for securing health, the
lawyer has techniques for securing justice. The law comprises a
powerful set of tools for doing justice in a sometimes unjust soci-
ety. Lawyers, like other professionals, must be careful to distin-
guish between the technical questions their training equips them to
ask and the ethical questions that inevitably accompany the techni-
cal questions.
As a guide through these moral mazes, lawyers have devised a
Code of Professional Responsibility.' But a code is a statement of
professional standards, not moral principles.8  Most of what a law-
yer should or should not do cannot be captured in a code.9 A code
cannot function as the final arbiter for right and wrong inasmuch
as it reflects one group's imperfect effort to articulate standards of
conduct. 10 The provisions of a code change according to our in-
7. See supra note 5.
8. "The Code of Professional Responsibility points the way to the aspiring and pro-
vides standards by which to judge the transgressor. Each lawyer must find within his
own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent to which his actions
should rise above minimum standards." MODEL CODE Preamble; see Comment, The
Lawyer's Moral Paradox, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1335 (1979) (the Model Code is commonly
misperceived as an ethical code when it is in effect regulatory, and does not supplant the
requirement for independent moral choice).
9. Goldman, Confidentiality, Rules, and Codes of Ethics, 3 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 8, 12
(Summer/Fall 1984).
10. The American Bar Association's current document setting standards of conduct
is the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Rules of ethics have a long history in the
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sights into what justice requires, along with economic, ideological
and political developments in our society.
Every experienced lawyer has paused at one time or another to
reflect on what to do in a morally ambiguous situation. Consider
the following cases:"
The will of a recently deceased businessman leaves a substantial
estate to your client's young children, the deceased's nieces and
nephews. Your client's family is quite poor, while the deceased's
own children are well-to-do. But you know the will is technically
flawed. You suspect the lawyer who drafted the will should have
known better. What should you do?
Your client is an elderly minister who has been a dedicated
and self-sacrificing member of the community throughout his
life. Because of his past generosity and present hard times, he
can no longer afford to make payments on a loan for house re-
pairs. The finance company, which will not negotiate, could be
put off for a year or longer by a procedural delay allowing this
elderly widower to live in peace. But such a delay, though com-
monly used, is contrary to court procedures. What should you
do?
Your client is seeking damages for four prized cows killed dur-
ing a neighbor's drunken spree. Although these cows would or-
dinarily be worth $2,000 each, they recently became infected and
would now fetch no more than $200 each. In pretrial negotia-
tions the neighbor's lawyer, not knowing the cows were diseased,
offers a settlement of $4,000. What should you do?
Your secretary accidentally destroys the four original, forged
checks a local bank had given you, the prosecutor. The attorney
for the accused forger, recently separated from her husband and
now caught up in a custody battle, assumes that you still have the
checks. The accused woman and her lawyer have come to your
office to negotiate a settlement. Unknown to her, the bank has
indicated that to protect its good name in the community it is
reluctant to press the case. What should you do?
These are offered as examples of the moral hazards of lawyering
that cannot be overcome simply by the application of technique.
United States. For a brief history of the rules of ethics in the United States, see L. PAT-
TERSON, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, § 1.02 (1982).
11. The first two examples are adapted from ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(F. Elliston & M. Davis eds., to be published in 1986). The two cases dealing with the
ethics of negotiations are adapted from Norbert Jacker's provocative presentation of the
American Bar Association's Tenth Annual Workshop on Lawyer's Professional Respon-
sibility, Denver, Colo., June 8th, 1984. Monroe Freedman has provided other well
known examples in his article, Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal De-
fense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966).
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They raise value questions about the moral weight of economic
hardships, moral merit, the obligation to tell the truth, and the
moral imperative not to exploit the ill- or uninformed.
B. Values Clarification and Professionalism
The contrast between ethical and technical judgments is not al-
ways easy to discern. Certain terms like "person," "guilty," or
"good" slide almost imperceptibly back and forth between the ethi-
cal and technical judgments. Only through a careful examination
of the context can one determine which sense is operative. The
study of ethics can help professionals draw this distinction more
sharply. It can help them become clearer on the meaning of moral
discourse and on the conflicting values in the workplace.
The criminal justice system serves different purposes. It has a
rehabilitative function: to teach criminals to mend their ways. 12 It
has a retribution function: to maintain respect for the law and to
suppress acts of private vengeance. 13 It has a preventative func-
tion: to deter the criminal himself from committing further
crimes."' It has a general deterrence function: to dissuade others
from committing future crimes. 5 These objectives can easily con-
flict. The habitual pick-pocket, having served his time, still poses a
threat to society. Should he be released? Under the retributive
principle, the answer is yes. Under the rehabilitative principle, the
answer is no. Philosophy helps sort out these conflicting princi-
ples, and thereby facilitates the work of professionals, who would
otherwise lack an integrated and coherent approach.
Conflicting principles of justice, although somewhat lofty and
abstract, impinge on the conduct of lawyers. Consider the follow-
ing hypothetical case:
In a private talk the county prosecutor, Fred Grim, offers to re-
duce the charges against your client, Vinnie Krule, from rape
12. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW 23 (1972) (under this theory, society
gives the convicted criminal appropriate treatment in order to return him to society re-
formed so that he will not need to commit further crimes).
13. Id. at 24 (under this theory, punishment commensurate with the crime is neces-
sary in order to restore societal peace of mind).
14. Id. at 22 (under this theory, punishment deters the criminal himself rather than
others).
15. Id. at 23 (under this theory, punishment deters others from committing future
crimes, lest they suffer the same fate). LaFave and Scott discuss two additional theories
of punishment: (1) restraint, where society protects itself from persons deemed danger-
ous by isolating these persons from society; and (2) education, where the publicity that
attends the trial, conviction, and punishment of criminals educates the public as to the
proper distinctions between good conduct and bad. Id. at 22-24.
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(which carries a 6-30 year sentence) to gross sexual imposition,
provided your client is willing to return a guilty plea. Further, he
will recommend probation. But Grim is seriously mistaken in his
belief that your client is a first offender who deserves this break.
In fact you know that he has two rape charges and an armed
robbery conviction against him in another state. What should
you do?
If you were concerned with rehabilitation, probation is unlikely
to succeed unless stringent conditions are attached. If you were
concerned with retribution, your client has gotten off far too lightly
for the offense he actually committed, although he may be getting
the sentence his offense deserves on Grim's erroneous understand-
ing of it. If you are concerned with specific deterrence, you should
reject the plea bargain; if anything it is likely to encourage your
client to engage in future misconduct on the grounds that he can
easily get away with it. Finally, if you are concerned with general
deterrence and protecting society, the punishment may be appro-
priate to deter the offender Grim has in mind, but it will not deter
people like Krule.
The problems of acting justly in an often unjust and imperfect
society have been compounded by questions of the moral responsi-
bility of lawyers for ensuring that decisions are made on the basis
of facts. Lawyers must grapple with their duty to represent clients
zealously within the bounds of the law. 6 They must deal with
conflicting obligations to their clients, their colleagues and the sys-
tem of which they are a part.1 7 All professionals, to one degree or
another, experience such conflicting obligations.' s Lawyers must
carefully weigh the strength of their allegiance to their client, to
their code of professional conduct and to the public. These require
delicate judgment calls. Such judgments are an integral part of
professional life. They serve individually to define the kind of pro-
fessional one is and collectively the kind of profession one serves.
C. Moral Reasoning and Professionalism
When professionals confront a moral dilemma, they confront a
16. MODEL CODE Canon 7. "In our government of laws and not of men, each mem-
ber of our society is entitled to have his conduct judged and regulated in accordance with
the law; to seek any lawful objective through legally permissible means; and to present
for adjudication any lawful claim, issue, or defense." MODEL CODE EC 7-1. "The
bounds of the law in a given case are often difficult to ascertain." MODEL CODE EC 7-2.
17. Id.
18. One of these dilemmas has become familiar under the rubric "whistleblowing."
Upon learning of intended wrongdoing by a client, the lawyer has to make a decision
whether to report it, whether to blow the whistle on the client, and, if so, to whom.
1985]
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series of arguments. The resolution requires a decision about
which arguments are good and which are bad. The study of ethics
shows professionals how to appraise these arguments against the
canons of consistency, coherence, validity and soundness. The
study of ethics points out fallacies in reasoning that easily lead one
astray. It explains what makes an argument valid and what makes
it invalid, and identifies valid and invalid arguments according to
their logical form. It dispels some disputes as verbal - merely
differences in the use of terms. Additionally, it locates the ground
on which the battle must ultimately be waged - the basic value
judgments on which the others depend.
By bringing a measure of rationality into disputes within the
professions, moral philosophers often keep professionals from be-
ing led astray by spurious reasoning. In so doing they have not
necessarily led professionals to the truth, but have at least checked
them from falling into irrationality, nonsense, and error.
D. Professionalism and Moral Truth
Professionals seek the social good. Doing so requires the ability
to identify the social good. Accordingly, one's very status as a pro-
fessional requires that one know this moral truth.
It requires more, however, for each profession seeks the social
good in a different form, according to its particular expertise. The
doctor seeks it in the form of health. The engineer seeks the social
good in the form of safe, efficient constructions. The lawyer seeks
it in the form of justice. Each profession, therefore, must know its
own form of the social good. Without such knowledge profession-
als cannot perform their social roles.
Moral considerations limit the means that professionals can use
to achieve the social good. Doctors who lie to a patient run the
danger of undermining the trust on which successful treatment de-
pends. Engineers who fail to blow the whistle on a faulty brake
design call into question their commitment and that of their peers
to public safety.' 9 Lawyers who conceal evidence that would in-
criminate an innocent client use bad means to a good end, and
jeopardize their standing as an agent of the court.20 Similarly, if
19. For a provocative critique of the failure of engineers to ensure the safety of the
public, see Kipnis, Engineers Who Kill: Professional Ethics and the Paramouncy of Public
Safety, 1 Bus. PROF. ETHICS 77 (Oct. 1981). For a discussion of the strategies to be used
to resolve disputes among engineers about safety and other professional matters, see F.
ELLISTON, WHISTLEBLOWING (1985).
20. The ABA Model provisions require that a lawyer's statements to the court be
truthful. MODEL CODE DR 7-102 (A)(5); MODEL RULES Rule 3.3 (a)(1).
[Vol. 16
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they let stand the perjured testimony of an innocent client, they
condone what is prima facie immoral in the name of justice.E'
Thus, morality imposes restrictions not only on the ends that are
sought, but on the ways in which we pursue those ends.
Whether or not one accepts these examples, some restrictions
are to be imposed on the means that lawyers can use in the pursuit
of justice.2 Establishing even minimal restriction requires some
conception of moral truth. To give up moral restrictions invites a
no-holds barred war in which lawyers can do whatever works to
get "justice" for their client. Such unregulated and unmitigated
legal warfare would threaten the very existence of law as a
profession.
IV. GOOD LAWYERS AND GOOD PEOPLE:
A NEW APPROACH 23
Many hold that to be a good lawyer one must be a morally good
person. Indeed, this assumption justifies moral character and fit-
ness tests. 4 Such tests presume that if one is not a morally good
person, one will not be a good lawyer. 5 Consequently, the boards
21. The qualification "prima facie" is needed because although it may seem at first
glance to be ethically bad to withhold evidence or to let erroneous testimony stand, many
lawyers and legal scholars hold that such actions are not ultimately bad. See, e.g., Freed-
man, supra note 11. Emphasizing the adversarial system within which American law is
practiced, it is contended that many seemingly wrong actions are justified. Id. The con-
frontation between the state prosecutor and the accused with a defense lawyer will yield
the truth and a fair adjudication, at least more often and more reliably than any alterna-
tive system for doing justice. Id.
The court in Dodd v. Florida Bar, 118 So. 2d 17, 19 (Fla. 1960), took a different view:
In our system the courts are almost wholly dependent on members of the bar to
marshal and present true facts . . . as to enable the judge or jury to cook the
adversary contentions in a crucible and draw off the. . . decisive facts to which
the law may be applied. When an attorney adds or allows false testimony...
he makes impure the product and makes it impossible for the scales to balance.
No breach of professional ethics, or of the law, is more harmful to the adminis-
tration of justice ....
22. The law does impose obligations on advocates that may conflict with the client's
ultimate objectives. Although a lawyer's paramount duty is to pursue vigorously the
client's interests, "that duty must be met in conjunction with, rather than in opposition
to, other professional obligations." Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 437 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976).
23. This section of the article is adapted from portions of an earlier article, Elliston,
Moral Character and Fitness Tests, 51 BAR EXAMINER, Aug. 1982 at 8.
24. All states make good moral character a condition for admission to the bar.
MODEL CODE DR 1-101 (b) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not further the application
for admission to the bar of another person known by him to be unqualified in respect to
character, education, or other relevant attribute."
25. MODEL CODE EC 1-5 provides that "[a] lawyer should maintain high standards
of professional conduct and should encourage fellow lawyers to do likewise. He should
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 16
of bar examiners disqualify individuals who the boards believe are
not morally good people. 6
One can debate at length about what attributes make someone a
morally good person.27 Many discussions of moral character and
fitness tests, which all practicing lawyers have passed, have focused
on this issue.2" Case law provides instructive and fascinating ex-
amples of the legal profession's own conception of a good person.
Bar admission committees and the courts have had to decide
whether a homosexual orientation,2 9 membership in a communist
organization,30 declaration of bankruptcy to avoid paying student
loans,31 or simply brewing beer3 2 are sufficiently serious moral
transgressions to disqualify one as a morally good person, and
hence justify excluding a candidate from the legal profession. 3
All these cases and debates are beside the point, however, if it is
not necessary to be a morally good person in order to be a good
be temperate and dignified, and he should refrain from all illegal and morally reprehensi-
ble conduct."
26. See supra note 24.
27. For a discussion of what makes a morally good person in the legal setting, see
Elliston, supra note 23, at 9-14.
28. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1957), where the court
observed that the term "good moral character" "by itself, is unusually ambiguous ...
Such a vague qualification, which is easily adapted to fit personal views and predilictions,
can be a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the right to
practice law." Good moral character tends to be defined in terms of the absence of cer-
tain kinds of conduct. See, e.g., Reese v. Board of Commissioners of Alabama State Bar,
379 So. 2d 564 (Ala. 1980) (the absence of conduct constituting acts of moral turpitude);
Pushinsky v. West Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 266 S.E.2d 444 (W. Va. 1980) (the
purpose of the good moral character requirement is to ensure that dishonest, unscrupu-
lous, or corrupt individuals will not become lawyers); In re Alkow, 64 Cal. 2d 838, 840,
415 P.2d 800, 802, 51 Cal. Rptr. 912, 914 (1966) (excluding "everything done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals," along with acts of "baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to
society in general").
29. In Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re: N.R.S., 403 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1981), the
court held that private, noncommercial sex acts between consenting adults were not rele-
vant to prove fitness to practice law. For a discussion of the moral status of homosexual-
ity, see PHILOSOPHY AND SEX, 353-440 (R. Baker & F. Elliston eds. 1984).
30. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1960); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82
(1960).
31. Compare Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re: Lonnie Neil Groot, 365 So. 2d 164
(Fla. 1978) with Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re: GWL, 364 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1978).
32. An attorney was disbarred for three years because he brewed beer. Bartos v.
U.S.D.C. Nebraska, 19 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1927).
33. Although the United States Supreme Court has found no constitutional infirmity
in requiring a person seeking admission to the bar to possess "character and fitness requi-
site for an attorney and counsellor-at-law," Law Students Civil Rights Research Counsel,
Inc., v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 159 (1970), denial of admission to the bar must be based
on factors having a rational connection with the applicant's fitness to practice law.
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
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lawyer. Indeed, if high moral standards are a hindrance in the
practice of law, then moral fitness tests and morality generally are
pointless. The moral fitness requirement is problematic. In its
place two alternative principles are offered:
That a good lawyer is sometimes immoral.
That a good lawyer is amoral.
What can be said in defense of these?
A. A Philosophical Challenge
The work of Allan Goldman challenges the simplistic view that
standard moral principles "apply" uniformly across all the profes-
sions. 34 Rather, he holds that moral principles must be worked out
within the context of a professional role. He distinguishes two
types of roles. A strongly differentiated professional role requires
unique and distinctive moral principles, different from those of mo-
rality generally. A weakly differentiated professional role only re-
quires general moral principles that are qualified, but not violated,
by the institutional context. In the case of the former, actions
which would otherwise be wrong could, for a certain profession, be
permissible or obligatory.
For example, it is ordinarily wrong to deceive people. But un-
dercover police officers regularly deceive suspects whom they be-
lieve have accepted illegal bribes or serve as fences for stolen
property.35 Similarly, in order to uphold the rule of law, judges
must defer to legal precedent even when it violates their own moral
sensibilities or those of the community at large. The role of these
criminal justice officials is thus, according to Goldman, strongly
differentiated.
These two examples, and Goldman's underlying arguments,
show that one cannot without further ado move from general
moral principles to an evaluation of the conduct of professionals.
The relation between ethics and the professions is more compli-
cated and must be worked out for each profession. 36
Of course, if Goldman is correct, it does not follow that lawyers
34. See A. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
(1978).
35. For a discussion of the ethics of police deception, see ABSCAM ETHICS (G. Caplan
ed. 1983); see also MORAL ISSUES IN POLICE WORK (Part II) (F. Elliston & M. Feldberg
eds. 1985).
36. See K. KIPNIS, LEGAL ETHICS (1985), for a rigorous and comprehensive effort to
work out the relationship between ethics and the legal profession.
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are immoral or amoral. But it does follow that if the practice of
law is a strongly differentiated profession, then one cannot judge
the moral conduct of a lawyer in a simple and straightforward way.
Rather, it would be permissible and sometimes obligatory for law-
yers to do things which if others did them would be suspect or even
wrong.
B. Challenges from the Profession
The legal literature on the professional responsibilities of lawyers
attempts to establish a detailed structure of professional ethics for
lawyers. In so doing many legal scholars have further challenged
the assumption that a good lawyer is a good person.37 One of the
most famous (or infamous) challenging scholars is Monroe
Freedman.38
In a groundbreaking article, Freedman argued that a lawyer
must put his client on the stand knowing that the client intends to
commit perjury.39 Ordinary moral standards dictate that it is
wrong to lie and to help others lie. Yet Freedman's lawyer would
not only be allowed to, but would be required to facilitate his cli-
ent's lying.'
Similarly, it is ordinarily wrong to prevent others from discover-
ing the truth. The duty of confidentiality, however, may forbid
disclosure in certain situations.4 1 In one celebrated case, People v.
Beige,4 2 a defendant in a murder prosecution told his lawyers the
location of the bodies of two others whom he had killed in an unre-
lated case.43 The lawyers visited the location where the bodies had
been hidden and confirmed the client's story. Nevertheless, it was
not until six months later, following the client's confession to those
crimes, that they informed law enforcement officials of their
knowledge concerning the bodies.44 Because of the duty of confi-
37. See, e.g., Wasserstrom, supra note 4.
38. See M. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975);
Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 191
(1978); Freedman, supra note 11.
39. Freedman, supra note 11, at 1477-78.
40. Id.
41. See MODEL CODE EC 4-1, EC 4-2, EC 4-4; DR 4-101; see also Callan & David,
Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality. Disclosure of Client Miscon-
duct in an Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332 (1976).
42. 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Onondega County Ct.), ajffd mem. 50 A.D.
2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S. 2d 771 (1975), affdper curiam, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d 377, 390
N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976).
43. Id.
44. Id.
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dentiality, the lawyers' actions have been defended by writers45 and
the lawyers were exonerated by the New York State Bar. 6
As a second case, consider the general moral principle that it is
wrong to harm innocent people. But if a defense attorney can dis-
credit a truthful rape victim's testimony, by taking advantage of
the fact that she is emotionally distraught, the Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility would permit and even require a lawyer to
do so.47
These examples can be multiplied, qualified and questioned.
They do point out, however, that the legal profession itself defends
actions ordinarily judged wrong. Legal scholars continue to chal-
lenge the principle that one must be a good person - in the ordi-
nary moral sense - in order to be a good lawyer.
Lest the implications be misunderstood, it is not being argued
here that it is morally permissible for a lawyer to do anything
whatsoever. We would not condone a lawyer for killing on behalf
of a client, or for committing fraud to help a client avoid repay-
ment of a debt. Moreover, if lawyers charged excessive fees, filed
false documents, betrayed confidences indiscriminately or lied to
each other regularly, the practice of law would be impossible. Ac-
cordingly, there are two constraints on what lawyers can do. The
first is what the criminal law prohibits: a lawyer is not morally
justified in violating the criminal law in zealous pursuit of a client's
interest. The second is what the legal practice as a business re-
quires: a lawyer cannot do what, if generally done, would under-
mine the practice of law as a business.48 Within these constraints,
45. See Armani, The Obligation of Confidentiality, JURIS, March 1975, at 3-5; Freed-
man, Where the Bodies are Buried: The Adversary System and the Obligation of Confiden-
tiality, 10 CRIM. LAW 979 (1974); Comment, Legal Ethics: Confidentiality and the Case
of Robert Garrow's Lawyers, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 211 (1975).
The public, unlike the above writers, reacted with outrage to the lawyer's actions. One
newspaper noted in an editorial that "[elthical conduct by legal representatives is a tenet
of our form of justice. In this case, it's impossible to imagine that many people - partic-
ularly the parents of the slain girls - would consider that justice has been served."
Times Union (Albany), June 21, 1974, at 11, col. 3. In a letter to the editor, a writer saw
the incident as "another deplorable example of behavior by members of this so-called
profession." Herald Journal (Syracuse), July 2, 1974, at 3, col. 4.
46. People v. Beige, 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S. 2d 798, (Onondega County Ct.),
aff'd mem., 50 A.D. 2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S. 2d 771 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 41 N.Y. 2d 60,
359 N.E. 2d 377, 390 N.Y.S. 2d 867 (1976).
47. See MODEL CODE Canon 7 (a lawyer should represent a client zealously within
the bounds of the law); see also Freedman, supra note 11, at 1475 (lawyer is obligated to
attack the reliability or credibility of an opposing witness whom he knows to be truthful).
48. For a philosopher's discussion of these constraints on law as a business, see N.
BOWIE, BUSINESS ETHICS (1982).
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however, lawyers are enjoined to do what would otherwise be im-
moral. Why?
C. The Roots of Professional Immorality
No doubt many would dismiss the above examples as aberra-
tions, exceptions to the rule that good lawyers are good people.
However, further examination shows that the adversary structure
and the rules regulating lawyers' conduct do not require that law-
yers be good people. Indeed, often the profession requires just the
opposite.4 9
For example, the basic principle that regulates lawyers' conduct
is the injunction to represent their clients' interests zealously
within the limits of the law.50 However one quibbles over the qual-
ification "zealously," the point remains that the primary determi-
nant of a lawyer's action is supposed to be the interests of the client
and the two primary constraints on a lawyer's action are what the
criminal law prohibits and what the business practice of law
requires.
Beyond these constraints, morality is supposed to be neither a
determinant nor a limit on a lawyer's conduct. If it is legal and
will help a client, a lawyer is obliged to do it. If it is legal and
immoral but will help a client, a lawyer is still supposed to do it.
In this view, the lawyer is an agent of the client, and in pursuing
the client's interests morality is to play no role.
In helping a client do something legal but wrong, the lawyer's
action can be judged in two ways. First, we might say that it is
wrong to help others do wrong. The sins of the client are to be
visited upon the lawyer and our moral appraisal of the client trans-
fers to the lawyer who is likewise judged to have committed a
moral wrong.
Alternatively, we can treat lawyers as mere tools of their clients:
their actions are no so much immoral as amoral. In this second
interpretation, one tries to save lawyers from immorality by
stressing their moral neutrality. But then lawyers cease to be pro-
fessionals exercising autonomous judgment and are relegated to the
status of tools. The implication is clear: lawyers are hired guns.
Whether the lawyer is regarded as occasionally immoral or basi-
cally amoral, a paradox is evident in the profession's self-regula-
tion. Upon entry into the profession, the prospective lawyer is
49. See infra note 53.
50. See supra note 47.
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required to be a morally good person. Yet, once admitted, in rep-
resenting clients the lawyer is required to be immoral if not amoral.
Of course, only the lawyer's role as an agent of the client is being
referred to here. As noted earlier, we might very well want moral-
ity to require that lawyers - like all business people - be honest
in charging clients only for work done and conscientious in report-
ing all income earned. We might very well condemn lawyers on
moral grounds for neglecting to keep clients informed - much as
we fault a supplier who does not inform customers about delays in
shipping. We might fault lawyers for failure to attend to their cli-
ent's case - much as we fault a mechanic who does not repair the
car we have dropped off for servicing. We might fault lawyers for
careless work much as we complain to plumbers who do not fix the
drain they were supposed to fix. In all their business dealings with
clients lawyers can still be subject to moral praise and blame -
just as any business person can.51 But in their professional capacity
as representatives of their clients' legal interests - which is one
distinction between lawyers and business people - morality would
play no role. The only limits would be imposed by the criminal
law and what law as a business requires.
V. TOWARDS A NEW CONCEPTION OF LAWYERING
Certainly this image of lawyers is not especially attractive to
either the public generally or to lawyers in particular. But what is
the alternative? We need a new conception of lawyering if we are
to restore lawyers to their status as professionals. If lawyers are
not autonomous moral agents, they are not professionals. If they
are just instruments of their clients' will, albeit within the limits of
the law and the demands of law as a business, they are technicians,
"hired guns," and not fully functioning professionals.
This picture is drawn in bold strokes to emphasize the central
dilemma in the practice of law today. One can propose various
measures to mediate the conflict between the demands of morality
and professionalism on the one hand, and the rights and interests
of clients on the other. The most common proposal is rather ad
hoc: to remove the lawyer from situations where ethics would
otherwise come into play. If a client's actions violate the demands
of morality and ethics, the lawyer can withdraw. 2
51. See BUSINESS ETHICS (W. Hoffman & J. Moore eds. 1984); N. BOWIE, supra note
48.
52. The Model Code currently provides some room for a lawyer to exercise moral
judgment in the acceptance of and withdrawal from representation. See MODEL CODE
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But this solution displaces the problem without solving it. As
long as everyone is entitled to representation, some lawyer will
need to assist that person in a legal but immoral act.13 There are
two solutions to this root dilemma. The first is to abandon the
demand that lawyers be moral persons in representing their clients.
But this solution comes at a very high price, one that most would
not be willing to pay. It requires that lawyers surrender their claim
to professional status. They must concede that they are no more
than technicians servicing the legal interests of clients.
The second, and more effective, solution is to recognize the cen-
trality of ethics to the practice of law, and to make a concerted
effort to develop the conscience of the lawyer. It requires that we
create and protect a sphere of moral autonomy within which law-
yers can exercise their ethical skills. It will require that lawyers
align themselves more with the courts and their peers and less with
their clients.
In this realignment, limits will be placed on the client's use of
lawyers to achieve immoral ends. Lawyers will have much more to
say about what they, as lawyers, are morally obliged to do - as
opposed to what they can do as provided by law. The lawyer's
advice to a client will not be limited to what is legally possible
given the relevant statutes and the facts of the case. The moral
responsibilities of the lawyer, in this new conception of lawyering,
will extend to what a decent and fair person could reasonably ex-
pect and ask for in a particular case.
This solution, concededly, calls for far-reaching reforms in law
as it is practiced today. It. would require acknowledging that, as
DR 2-109(A) (1) (mandating refusal to accept employment when the client clearly in-
tends to bring an action "merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any
person"); MODEL CODE DR 2-109(A)(2) (mandating refusal to accept employment
where client seeks to bring an action for which no reasonable legal argument can be
made); MODEL CODE DR 2-110(B)(1) (mandating withdrawal when lawyer knows that
client is conducting litigation solely to harass); MODEL CODE DR 2-110(C)(l)(a) (al-
lowing withdrawal when client insists upon presenting a claim or defense for which no
reasonable legal justification can be advanced); MODEL CODE DR 2-110(C) (1) (b), (c)
(allowing withdrawal when client insists upon an illegal course of action). The Model
Code rationale seems to be that a lawyer who has scruples about the client's proposed
legal action is not likely to adequately serve his client. Postema, Moral Responsibility in
Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 85 (1980).
53. One author suggests that since the rationale behind the Model Code seems to be
that a lawyer who has scruples about his client's proposed legal action is not likely to
adequately serve his client, the Model Code encourages the lawyer to "steel himself
against such moral scruples and to view them as strictly personal feelings which have no
place in professional behavior - a kind of unbecoming moral squeamishness." Postema,
supra note 52, at 85.
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professionals, lawyers exercise not just their technical skills but
their moral conscience. Not only the legal profession, but the pub-
lic generally would need to be educated about the broader respon-
sibilities of the legal profession. Lawyers are not to be treated as
technicians trained in the martial arts of legal combat, but profes-
sionals regularly called upon to exercise their capacity for in-
dependent moral judgment. Insofar as lawyers are to function as
moral agents, they must have the correct moral beliefs to guide
their professional judgment. Like Plato's ancient guardians of the
Republic, they must know what justice is, a knowledge that can
only be acquired through a careful study of ethics.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that ethics is essential to the practice of
law insofar as lawyers are professionals. The practical conse-
quences of integrating ethics into the practice of law are difficult to
imagine. But insofar as a lawyer is a person, with a conscience, the
tensions between the demands of morality have been felt already,
and must be resolved by each individual. Clearly, ethics should be
treated as of fundamental importance to the practice of law for,
without it, the practice of law is not truly a profession.
1985]

